Cooperating with the future by Hauser, OP et al.
Cooperating with the future 
 
Oliver P. Hauser1*, David G. Rand2,3*, Alexander Peysakhovich1,2, Martin A. Nowak1† 
 
1 Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 
2 Department of Psychology, 3 Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511 
 
* These authors contributed equally to this work. 
† To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: martin_nowak@harvard.edu 
 
Overexploitation of renewable resources today has a high cost on the welfare of future 
generations1-5. Unlike in other public goods games6-9, however, future generations cannot 
reciprocate actions made today. What mechanisms can maintain cooperation with the 
future? To answer this question, we devise a new experimental paradigm, the 
‘Intergenerational Goods Game’. A line-up of successive groups (generations) can each 
either extract a resource to exhaustion or leave something for the next group. Exhausting 
the resource maximises the payoff for the present generation, but leaves all future 
generations empty-handed. Here we show that the resource is almost always destroyed if 
extraction decisions are made individually. This failure to cooperate with the future is 
driven primarily by a minority of individuals who extract far more than what is 
sustainable. In contrast, when extractions are democratically decided by vote, the resource 
is consistently sustained. Voting10-15 is effective for two reasons. First, it allows a majority 
of cooperators to restrain defectors. Second, it reassures conditional cooperators16 that 
their efforts are not futile. Voting, however, only promotes sustainability if it is binding for 
all involved. Our results have implications for policy interventions designed to sustain 
intergenerational public goods. 
 
Providing for future generations is central to the survival of genes, families, organizations, 
nations and the global ecosystem1-5. Yet providing for the future poses a challenge, as it requires 
making sacrifices today. Institutions can play an important role in promoting such cooperative 
behaviour among large groups of people. Traditionally, institutional designers have assumed that 
people are rational and purely self-interested, and proposed incentives that induce selfish people 
to cooperate17-19.  
 
In recent years, however, a large body of evidence has demonstrated that many people are not 
purely selfish5,20-25. Here we consider the implications of these ‘social preferences’ for designing 
institutions that promote sustainability and intergenerational cooperation. We demonstrate that 
democracy can be a powerful institution for harnessing social preferences: while selfish people 
would vote for over-exploitation of resources, voting allows a prosocial majority to override a 
selfish minority. (See Supplementary Information, SI, Section 1 for further motivating 
discussion.)  
 
To do so, we introduce a laboratory model of cooperating with the future – the Intergenerational 
Goods Game (IGG) – that builds on previous work using Public Goods Games7-9, Common Pool 
Resource games6,11 and Threshold games4,26,27. In these other games, selfishness creates social 
efficiency losses for the other members of one’s group. In contrast, the IGG is designed such that 
selfishness instead negatively impacts subsequent groups.  
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In our IGG experiments, individuals form groups of five, which we refer to as generations. The 
first generation is endowed with a common pool of 100 units and each individual can extract 
between 0 and 20 units from the pool. If the total percentage of units extracted from the pool is at 
or below a commonly known extraction threshold, T, the pool will renew to 100 units for the 
next generation. If, however, the percentage extracted is above T, the pool is exhausted and all 
future generations receive no payoff (Figure 1). After each generation, another generation occurs 
with probability δ, and with probability 1-δ the game ends: the discount factor δ models the 
extent to which the current generation values the next generation. (See SI Section 2 for further 
experimental details.) 
 
In the game theoretic tradition, the IGG framework is a great simplification relative to real-world 
intergenerational cooperation. For discussion of important aspects of intergenerational transfer 
which the IGG does yet not incorporate, as well as relation of our work to previous results on 
intergenerational transfer, see SI Section 3.  
 
To explore behaviour in the IGG, we begin with an ‘unregulated’ treatment: each group member 
individually chooses how many units to extract from the pool. We initialize 20 unregulated 
IGGs, and pass each game’s pool across a series of generations with a discount factor of δ=0.8 
(leading to an expected game length of five generations). For the pool to be replenished, each 
generation must extract 50 units or less (T=50%). Thus the socially efficient extraction (or ‘fair 
share’) is 10 units per individual on average. We focus on symmetric strategies and refer to 
individuals who extract 10 or fewer units as cooperators, and those who extract more than 10 
units as defectors.  
 
We find that a large majority of individuals cooperate (68%), in line with previous studies using 
non-student populations23-25. Despite their good intentions, however, only 4 of the 18 games 
continuing on to a second generation have their pools sustained. These losses in sustainability 
compound quickly over time: in generation 3, the number of refilled pools is down to two, and 
not a single refilled pool is available to the 4th generation (Figure 2a). Notably, in most groups, 
only a minority of defectors is responsible for the exhaustion of the resource.  
 
To address this sustainability failure, we introduce an institution that is central to the Western 
world: democracy. Each group member votes for their generation’s extraction level, and the 
median vote is extracted by all players. Well studied by economists and political scientists10-15, 
this ‘median voting’ rule guarantees socially optimal outcomes in a standard Public Goods 
Game, even with perfectly self-interested actors: the payoff-maximising vote is full 
cooperation14,15. In the IGG, however, this is not true: because the current group does not reap 
the benefits of cooperation, selfish players would vote to deplete the resource fully. From a 
traditional ‘public choice’ perspective based on rational self-interest, therefore, median voting is 
not attractive for promoting sustainability. If, however, enough players have social preferences, 
voting may be able to support sustainability in the IGG by allowing prosocial players to reign in 
selfish players. Thus a ‘behavioural public choice theorem’12-14 might favour median voting; see 
SI Section 1 for further discussion.   
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To explore the effects of median voting, we initialize another 20 IGGs using δ=0.8 and T=50%, 
and applied the voting rule. We find a dramatic increase in sustainability (Figure 2b): all 20 
common pools are sustained across all generations (unregulated vs. voting: linear probability 
model (LPM) predicting pool sustainability at the generation level, p<0.001; see SI Section 4 for 
statistical details).  
 
Next we ask how robust the voting mechanism is to variation in the discount factor, δ, and the 
extraction threshold, T. In the experiments described above, there was an 80% chance that a 
future generation would exist (δ=0.8) and individuals had to sacrifice half of their possible 
payoff to extract a ‘fair share’ (T=50%). We now examine the effectiveness of voting in two 
treatments using lower δ values (δ=0.7 and δ=0.6, creating fewer future generations), and two 
other treatments using lower T values (T=40% and T=30%, leading to a higher cost of 
cooperation). Each treatment again started with 20 pools.  
 
We find that voting remains largely effective in promoting sustainability under these more 
adverse conditions (Figure 2c). Although sustainability does vary significantly with δ (LPM, 
p=0.037) and T (LPM, p<0.001), the size of these effects is relatively small: decreasing δ or T 
by 0.1 decreases the probability of a pool being sustained by 4.6% or 14.6%, respectively. 
Moreover, under all conditions tested, voting leads to much higher levels of sustainability than 
the original unregulated IGG (LPM, p<0.001 for all comparisons). 
 
The success of voting is driven by two factors. First, the decision-making power differs in the 
voting and unregulated institutions (Figure 3a). In the voting institution, a majority of three 
cooperators who propose 10 unit extractions can overrule two defectors who propose 20 units. In 
contrast, if decisions are made at the individual level, a single defector can tip the balance of a 
group. In other words, voting allows a majority of cooperators to restrain a minority of defectors. 
 
The second reason for the success of voting pertains to the psychology of social preferences. 
Median voting addresses the fears of players who care about future generations but worry that 
others (now or later) will exhaust the pool (i.e., future-oriented ‘conditional cooperators’16): 
since the outcome of the vote is applied to all players, everyone within a generation receives the 
same payoff and no one risks being the ‘sucker’. This, in turn, further increases the probability 
that a cooperative majority is formed and the pool is sustained, both in the current generation and 
in the future. Figure 3b is consistent with this assessment: the fraction of cooperators is 20% 
larger under voting than unregulated (LPM coef=0.201, p<0.001).  
 
Both of these factors predict that voting is only successful if everyone is bound by the outcome: 
a partial implementation15 provides an opportunity both for defectors to derail sustainability, and 
for potential cooperators to switch to defection out of fear that others will over-exploit.  
 
We test this prediction by introducing a ‘partial voting’ treatment (another 20 pools, again using 
δ=0.8 and T=50%). Three of the five people in each generation are bound by the decision of a 
median vote among themselves. The other two people are not informed of the vote’s outcome, 
and decide freely how much to extract. The sum of all five extractions is then compared to the 
extraction threshold T.  
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As predicted, the partial voting institution is significantly less successful than the full voting 
institution (Figure 4a, LPM p<0.001). This point is driven home by bootstrapping simulations: 
of 10,000 pools created by randomly sampling participant decisions each generation, only 1.5% 
of available pools are sustained after 15 generations under partial voting, compared to 84% under 
full voting; see Extended Data Figure 1 and SI Section 5 for details. We conclude that, for voting 
to effectively manage sustainability, it must be binding for all decision-makers.  
 
In this paper, we have introduced a new laboratory model for cooperation across generations, the 
Intergenerational Goods Game (IGG). We have shown that in the absence of regulation, a 
minority of selfish players consistently deplete available resources. By implementing median 
voting, however, this negative outcome can be prevented – but only if all players are bound by 
the outcome of the vote. Votes that are only partially binding, such as the international Kyoto 
protocol, have little power. 
 
More generally, our results emphasize the importance of institutional designers moving away 
from the assumption of universal self-interest. We extend the ‘behavioural public choice 
theorem’12-14 by demonstrating how voting can allow a majority of prosocial individuals to 
override a purely selfish minority, leading to costly group-level cooperation with future 
generations. Real-world data are consistent with this suggestion: countries that are more 
democratic also have more sustainable energy policies (combining data for 128 countries from 
the Economist’s Democracy Index and World Energy’s Energy Sustainability Index, p<0.001, 
R2=0.36; robust to controlling for GDP, Gini index, population size, literacy rate, unemployment 
rate, life expectancy, and level of corruption; see Extended Data Figure 2 and SI Section 6 for 
details). Policy makers can do much to promote the public good by using a behavioural approach 
that is informed by a more accurate understanding of human psychology14,28-30. Many citizens are 
ready to sacrifice for the greater good. We just need institutions that help them do so.  
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Figure Legends: 
 
Figure 1. An illustration of the intergenerational game (IGG): In each generation, a group of 
5 people makes a decision (individually or according to an institutional rule) about their level of 
extraction from a common resource. a, If Generation 1’s extractions do not violate the commonly 
known threshold, the resource refills and the same dilemma is presented to Generation 2. After 
each generation, another generation occurs with probability δ. b, If at any point the threshold 
requirement is not met, the resource does not renew and future generations receive no payoff. 
Maximal social welfare is achieved if no generation ever violates the threshold requirement by 
extracting too much from the common resource. 
 
Figure 2. Solving the (intergenerational) tragedy of the commons through an institutional 
design. a, When decisions are made at the individual level, the availability of the common pools 
drastically decreases over time; N=480. b, The introduction of a democratic voting institution 
dramatically improves sustainability; N=370. c, Decreasing the discount factor from δ=0.8 to 
δ=0.7 (N=355) or δ=0.6 (N=305) while holding T=50%, or the extraction threshold from T=50% 
to T=40% (N=600) or T=30% (N=460) while holding δ=0.8,  increases the temptation to defect. 
Nonetheless, much less is extracted under median voting compared to the unregulated baseline. 
Errors bars indicate standard errors of the mean.  
 
Figure 3. The voting institution is robust to extreme decision-makers and thereby increases 
cooperative behaviour. a, The pivotal decision-maker in the voting institution is different from 
the unregulated institution. For instance, assume that T=50%, and that a cooperator and a 
defector always extract 10 and 20 units, respectively. The unregulated institution is vulnerable to 
extreme decision-makers, whereas the voting institution is robust to a minority of defectors. This, 
in turn, bolsters the decision of those who are predisposed towards cooperation but fear to be 
exploited (e.g., future-oriented ‘conditional cooperators’). b, This leads to an increase of 
cooperators in the voting institution (N=370) over the unregulated institution (N=480).  
 
Figure 4. We confirm the hypothesis that voting must be binding for all players to achieve 
high levels of sustainability. a, In a partially implemented voting institution (N=495), three of 
the individuals are bound to a vote while the other two can extract at will. A partially 
implemented voting institution is not robust to a minority of defectors and also cannot reassure 
conditional cooperators. Thus, partial voting fails to lead to sustainable outcomes. b, Three real 
sets of decisions from our data demonstrate a consequence of the pivotal extractor outside the 
voting group.  
 
Extended Data Figure 1. Bootstrapping simulations demonstrate the robustness of full 
voting, and the failure of partial voting. We address sources of noise in the sequence of events 
that occurred in our experiment by conducting a set of computer simulations using the data 
generated by our participants. We randomly sample (with replacement) a series of generations of 
participant decisions, and calculate the fraction of those generations in which the pool was 
refilled. For each condition, we simulate 10,000 pools (or 1,000,000 pools if δ<0.8) for 15 
generations. a, Simulated data for the unregulated, full voting and partial voting conditions show 
that the voting is by far the most successful at sustaining the pool. b, Simulated data for the 
T=40%, T=30%, δ=0.7 and δ=0.6 conditions shows that reducing δ has only a small effect, and 
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although reducing T does undermine sustainability, the effect is much less dramatic than that of 
unregulated or partial voting despite the higher value of T in these less-regulated conditions.  
 
Extended Data Figure 2. Real-world data support our experimental conclusions, as 
countries with more democratic governments have more sustainable energy policies.  
Energy sustainability index (as measured by World Energy) is shown as a function of the 
Democracy Index (as measured by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit) for N=128 countries. A 
strong positive association is clearly visible, and this association is robust to controlling for gross 
domestic product (GDP), Gini index, population size, literacy rate, unemployment rate, life 
expectancy, and level of corruption. Thus we provide preliminary empirical support for the role 
of democracy in promoting sustainability outside the laboratory. We adopt the colouring and 
naming scheme from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s classification of regimes. 
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1. Theoretical motivation 
 
In this paper, we ask how different institutional rules lead individuals to conserve 
resources, leaving enough to provide for the next generation. In particular, we are 
interested in institutions that create sustainable outcomes by harnessing social 
preferences, and thus may be overlooked when relying on assumptions of rational self-
interest.  
 
We focus on the institution of median voting1-4. Among selfish players, median voting 
can promote intra-generational cooperation (i.e. cooperation in traditional public goods 
and common pool resource games)3,5. The essential structure of intra-generational 
cooperation is that a group of cooperators earns more than a group of defectors, but that 
the highest payoff comes from unilaterally defecting in a group where everyone else 
cooperates. Because median voting binds all players to the same action, unilateral 
defection is impossible. Therefore the highest payoff is earned by being in a group where 
everyone cooperates, and selfish players will vote for cooperation. This makes median 
voting an attractive institution for promoting cooperation under assumptions of rational 
self-interest in an intra-generational social dilemma.  
 
However, this is not true in the context of intergenerational cooperation. In our 
intergenerational goods game (IGG), all benefits created by the current generation’s 
cooperation are reaped by subsequent generations. Therefore it is no longer true that a 
group of cooperators earns more than a group of defectors. Instead, it is the case that a 
series of cooperative groups, who sustain a pool over multiple generations, earn more in 
total than a series where one defecting groups exhausts the pool early on. But an 
individual’s payoff is unaffected by the choices of the other members of her own 
generation. Whereas in the traditional PGG, one’s own payoff increases when others in 
the same group cooperate, in the IGG one’s own payoff increases when members of the 
previous generation have cooperated.  
 
Therefore a player in generation i maximizes her payoff in the IGG by extracting the 
maximum amount, and is indifferent (monetarily) to the extraction amounts of other 
members of generation i. Because of this, selfish players will vote to extract the 
maximum amount in the IGG, unlike in the PGG. This would lead traditional theories of 
public choice, based on rational self-interest, to conclude that median voting is not a good 
solution for promoting intergenerational transfer. 
 
However, the picture changes dramatically once social preferences are taken into 
account. A large body of literature suggests that a majority of people in many contexts 
are not purely self-interested, but instead care to some extent about the well-being of 
others6. People with these kinds of prosocial preferences may be willing to pay a cost to 
benefit members of future generations. However, they may also have ‘conditional 
cooperation’ preferences7, which is to say that they prefer cooperating as long as others 
(both in their own generation and in future generations) cooperate as well.  
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Consider how a strong conditional cooperator who cares about future generations would 
play our IGG (in groups of five). In the unregulated condition, she would cooperate if she 
expected all four others to cooperate (and all members of future generations to 
cooperate), and would defect otherwise. Under median voting, however, she would vote 
for cooperation as long as she expects at least two others in her generation (and 3 others 
in future generations) to vote for cooperation, because only three cooperative votes are 
needed to make the median vote cooperative. Thus, in a population of players of which 
some are future-oriented conditional cooperators, median voting can substantially 
increase the fraction of people choosing to cooperate.  
 
Furthermore, median voting decreases the number of cooperators needed for 
sustainability to be achieved. Following similar logic as above, five cooperative choices 
are needed in the unregulated cases, whereas only three are needed under median voting. 
Therefore, median voting also makes it easier not to over-exploit the pool.  
 
Critically, however, the predicted success of median voting hinges on a large fraction of 
the population having social preferences. If all players were purely self-interested, 
sustainability would never be achieved in either the unregulated or the median voting 
conditions.  
 
Our experiments are therefore designed to differentiate between the pessimistic 
prediction of classical public choice theory based on rational self-interest, and the 
optimistic prediction of a ‘behavioural public choice theorem’ rooted in social 
preferences8.  
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Data Collection on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
For all of our experiments, we recruited U.S. residents to participate using the online 
labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Our experiment was approved by 
Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research, and informed 
consent was obtained from all subjects. 
 
To preserve random assignment, each generation for all conditions was run at the same 
time, and subjects within each generation were randomly assigned to one of our seven 
experimental condition. Each experimental condition is described in more detail below. 
 
AMT is an online market place in which employers can pay users for completing short 
tasks (generally about 10 minutes) – usually referred to as Human Intelligence Tasks 
(HITs) – for a relatively small pay (generally less than a $1). Workers who have been 
recruited on AMT receive a baseline payment and can also be paid a bonus depending on 
their performance in the task. This setup lends itself well to adopt incentivised economic 
experiments: the baseline payment acts as the ‘show up’ fee and the bonus payment may 
derive from the workers’ behaviour in the economic game and/or other tasks throughout 
the experiment. 
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A major advantage for using AMT is that the sample of recruited subjects has been 
shown to be more diverse and more nationally representative than the typical college 
student sample at major research universities, at which many economic games are run9-12.  
 
There may, of course, exist potential issues on AMT that would not occur in a traditional 
laboratory setting. For instance, running an experiment online involves giving up some 
control over subjects, since they cannot be monitored, as is usually the case in 
laboratories. That is, it cannot be ruled out that more than a single person is taking part in 
the experiment or that one person is participating more than once in the experiment 
(although AMT has put extensive measures into place to avoid this from happening; in 
addition, we have also implemented ways to carefully screen out any possible re-takers). 
Finally, the participating subject sample, albeit more diverse and representative than the 
average college students sample, is biased towards those who participate in online labour 
markets in the first place. To address these possible concerns, numerous studies have 
been carried out to validate results collected using AMT. Of particular relevance to the 
present study, very similar levels of prosociality have been found on AMT and in the lab 
(using an order of magnitude higher stakes) in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma11, Public 
Goods Game10, Trust Game10 and Ultimatum Game10. 
 
2.2 Basic flow of the experiments 
All participants earned a $0.50 showup fee and had the opportunity to earn up to an 
additional $1 in bonus payments depending on the outcome of the IGG. Participants took 
part in the experiment through an online survey provided by Qualtrics. After participants 
had read the experiment instructions (see Section 6 below), they had to pass a 
comprehension quiz about the rules of the game in order to partake in the actual 
experiment. Those who didn’t pass the quiz received only the baseline payment of $0.50, 
and are excluded from our analyses (in accordance with common practice on AMT11).  
 
The details of the decision-making stage depended on experimental condition, and the 
state of the common pool: if the threshold requirement had not been violated by a 
previous group and the pool had thus refilled to 100 units, participants made their choice 
about their extraction or vote (depending on the experimental condition they were in; 
explained in more detailed below). If the extraction threshold had been exceeded 
previously, the common pool was empty; in this case, the participants were informed 
about this fact and made no decision nor received any bonus payment beyond the 
baseline payment (i.e., the show-up fee).  
 
We were concerned that the instructions in the Partial Voting condition were more 
complicated than in the other conditions, and therefore that substantially more subjects 
might fail the initial comprehension check in Partial Voting (and thus be excluded). This 
could be potentially problematic because it would mean that the people who got to 
participate in the Partial Voting condition would be ‘smarter’ on average than participants 
in the other conditions, and this could bias our results if ability to pass more complicated 
comprehension questions was correlated with behaviour in the IGG.  
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We sought to mitigate this problem as follows. After the decision-making stage (so as to 
not influence their decisions), participants in all conditions other than Partial Voting were 
presented with the Partial Voting instructions and the corresponding comprehension quiz. 
Participants had to pass both comprehension checks correctly to receive their bonus, and 
we only include subjects who passed both quizzes in our analyses. (To keep the 
experiment approximately equal length across conditions, we also required participants in 
the Partial Voting condition to read the instructions for the Unregulated condition and 
answer the associated comprehension questions.) 
 
As expected, substantially fewer subjects passed the first set of comprehension questions 
in the Partial Voting condition (52%) compared to the other simpler conditions (67%). 
However, our mitigation strategy was largely successful: the fraction of subjects passing 
both sets of comprehension questions was much closer, with 49% passing Partial and 
54% passing in the other conditions. Given the considerable magnitude of our treatment 
effects reported below, we think it is unlikely that this 5% difference in comprehension 
rates had a substantially effect on our results.  
 
The experiments were approved by the Harvard University Committee on the Use of 
Human Subjects in Research. 
 
2.3 General experimental design 
In total our experiment had seven experimental conditions: unregulated, baseline voting, 
voting δ=0.7, voting δ=0.6, voting T=40%, voting T=30%, partial voting. Before 
describing the details of each condition, we describe the basic structure which is common 
to all conditions.  
 
In each condition, 20 resource pools were initiated with 100 units in generation 1. After 
every generation, there was a probability δ that another generation would be recruited 
(i.e. that the game would be ‘continued’). In most conditions, δ = 0.8, such that the 
expected number of generations per game was 5. We chose a sample size of 20 games per 
condition at the outset of the experiment, and did not collect any additional data once all 
20 games had been run. 
 
Generations were recruited sequentially, with each generation being informed of the 
outcome of the previous generation as described below. The list of resulting lengths (i.e. 
# of generations) for each game in each treatment was: 
 
Unregulated 8 2 6 3 4 12 2 2 13 3 6 1 5 4 6 1 5 4 5 4 
Voting baseline 5 2 1 8 5 5 3 5 2 1 12 1 4 5 2 3 1 2 5 2 
Voting δ=0.7 4 1 1 2 5 1 3 2 6 2 2 2 5 3 13 2 9 1 1 6 
Voting δ=0.6 6 1 2 1 1 2 5 8 1 2 2 1 1 2 8 6 3 4 4 1 
Voting T=40% 4 1 12 4 1 12 4 2 6 14 13 5 1 7 12 4 1 5 7 5 
Voting T=30% 5 4 1 6 6 6 3 5 6 4 1 1 3 5 6 13 4 10 2 1 
Partial Voting 13 1 1 3 2 14 5 1 11 2 3 5 9 1 5 7 1 4 9 2 
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Within each generation of a game, a group of five participants chose how many units to 
extract from the pool (out of a total of 100 units). (The mechanism by which this choice 
was made varied across conditions, as described below). If the fraction extracted within a 
given group did not exceed the extraction threshold of T, that group’s pool would be 
‘sustained’: the next generation would receive a pool refilled to 100 units and have a 
chance to make their own set of extraction decisions (provided that the game was 
continued based on the continuation probability δ such that there was indeed another 
generation).  
 
If, on the other hand, the fraction extracted exceeded T, the pool was exhausted. All 
future generations were informed that previous more than T units had been extracted 
from the pool, and as a result they (the current generation) would not have the 
opportunity to play the IGG or receive any bonus payment.  
 
Participants in Generation 1 were informed that they were the first generation. 
Participants in subsequent generations were informed that the previous generation had 
either sustained or not sustained the pool. They were not informed, however, of the 
specific generation number (other than showing that they were not the first) they were 
because the total number of continued generations varied across pools and conditions due 
to the random continuation device, and we did not want to introduce this as a source of 
bias. 
 
Note that in the IGG, a series of generations where each generation acts sustainably (i.e., 
extracts T units) has an expected total payoff of T/(1-δ). A series of generations where 
everyone extracts the maximum (and therefore the pool is exhausted after the first 
generation), has an expected total payoff of 100 (the contents of the pool in the first 
generation). Thus acting sustainably is socially efficient as long as T/(1-δ) > 100. 
2.4 Details of each condition 
Our experimental conditions differed in two ways: the manner in which the number of 
extracted units was determined (i.e., the institution: unregulated, voting, or partial voting) 
and the specific values of δ and T. 
 
First we describe the three different institutions.  
• Under the unregulated institution, each of the five group members independently 
selected an extraction amount between 0 and 20 units.  
• Under the voting institution, each of the five group members proposed an 
extraction amount between 0 and 20 units. The median proposal amount was then 
extracted for each group member.  
• Under the partial voting institution, (i) three of the five group members proposed 
an extraction amount between 0 and 20 units and the median proposal amount 
was then extracted for each of the three; while (ii) the other two group members 
independently selected an extraction amount between 0 and 20 units. 
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The values of δ and T used in condition are given below, as well as the average game 
length and resulting number of subjects recruited (note that the criterion for sustainability 
to be socially efficient, T/(1-δ) > 100, is met in all cases): 
 
 
Condition δ T Mean # Generations N 
Unregulated 0.8 50% 4.8 480 
Voting 0.8 50% 3.7 370 
Voting δ = 0.7 0.7 50% 3.6 355 
Voting δ = 0.6 0.6 50% 3.1 305 
Voting T = 40% 0.8 40% 6.0 600 
Voting T = 30% 0.8 30% 4.6 460 
Partial voting 0.8 50% 5.0 495 
2.5 Statistical Analysis 
To analysis the data, we use linear probability models to estimate the effect of institution 
on pool sustainability. Groups in which the game was continued and the pool was 
sustained are coded as 1 (i.e., groups which received a full pool and did not extract more 
than T units).  Groups in which the game was continued but the pool was exhausted are 
coded as 0 (i.e., groups which received a full pool and extracted more than T units, or 
groups which received an exhausted pool). Once a game was discontinued (i.e., after the 
random number drawn for continuation was greater than δ), no more groups were 
recruited and so no subsequent generations for that pool appear in the regression.  
 
Thus we compare the fraction of continued games that have sustained pools, with one 
observation per group of five participants. Because of the randomness of the continuation 
device, the number of groups is not identical across conditions. To partially address this 
issue, as well as to account for the fact that outcomes of groups which receive exhausted 
pools are not independent of outcomes of earlier groups in that game, we cluster standard 
errors in our regressions at the level of the game. Furthermore, in Section 4, we 
compliment this regression analysis with an analysis using a large number of simulated 
game lengths and random permutations of extraction decisions/proposals.  
 
3. Future directions for the IGG and relations to previous 
work 
 
In the game theoretic tradition, the IGG framework is a great simplification relative to 
real-world intergenerational cooperation. We feel that this simplification captures key 
elements of the intergenerational challenge facing our world: the game is non-zero sum, 
with cooperation today creating greater benefits for the future; the consequences of 
consumption are non-linear, such that some amount of consumption can occur in the 
present without imposing costs on the future; and the cooperative challenge involves 
group-level decisions rather than just individual-to-individual transfers.  
 
Cooperating with the future – Supplementary Information  
 
 
Page S8 of S30 
There are, however, many aspects of intergenerational cooperation which the IGG does 
yet not incorporate. Although we include a probabilistic continuation rule for future 
discounting, there may be important elements of the psychology of discounting which 
this approach does not capture. Additionally, future generations are our relatives, will 
likely be richer than us, and may have access to technological innovations that could 
mitigate our current environmental concerns. 
 
Future work extending our IGG framework to examine these issues, as well as exploring 
intergenerational cooperation among larger groups, overlapping generations13, and groups 
with the possibility of borrowing against the future (i.e. running up national debt) will 
help to advance our understanding of real-world intergenerational cooperation. So too 
will considering spatial effects, where over-consumption in one area has little 
consequence for individuals living far away14. 
 
Our IGG experiments add to a nascent literature on cooperation across generations. 
Previous work has demonstrated that coordination, communication and social reputation 
help meet targets in groups to avoid collective loss15-18. Our voting intervention is also a 
type of coordination mechanism. It helps coordinate people’s preferences towards their 
own gains and those of future generations19.  
 
Additionally, other work has emphasised that altruism depends on previous generations’ 
behaviour as well as the personal distance between donors and recipients of the 
intergenerational good20,21. We thus expect that the results in our IGG would be further 
magnified if the longevity of a common pool was made salient to later generations or if 
personal relationships existed between individual members of generations, as in the case 
of families. In contrast, we expect that factors such as uncertainty, inequality, and global 
sanctioning approaches would lead to lower rates of cooperation and sustainability17,22,23. 
 
Our experiments also build on previous work exploring the interaction between voting 
institutions and social preferences. In particular, it has been shown that voting 
mechanisms can override anti-social behaviour where cooperators are punished, because 
typically only a minority hold such anti-social preferences4,8,24. Our results extend this 
‘behavioural public choice theorem’. We demonstrate how voting can allow a majority of 
prosocial individuals to override a purely selfish (rather than anti-social) minority, 
leading to costly group-level cooperation with future generations. 
 
 
4. Statistical details 
 
4.1 Unregulated vs. voting!
Here we ask the basic question of how sustainability under the unregulated institution 
compares to sustainability under the voting institution (both using δ = 0.8 and T = 50%). 
We begin by considering just the first generation (Table S1 col. 1). We see that 
dramatically more pools are sustained under voting. Pooling across all generations (Table 
S1 col. 2) we see an even bigger positive effect of voting.  
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Table S1: Linear probability model estimating the effect of institution on pool 
sustainability. Standard errors clustered at pool level. 
 
 1st Generation All Generations 
1=Voting 0.800 0.938 
 (0.092)*** (0.025)*** 
Constant 0.200 0.062 
 (0.092)* (0.025)* 
R2 0.67 0.87 
N    40 170 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
In addition to this group-level outcome, we examine how the voting institution changes 
behaviour at the individual level. In particular, we examine the fraction of subjects 
behaving prosocially in each condition.  
 
To do so, we label individuals as “cooperators” if they choose to extract 10 units or less 
in the unregulated condition, or vote to extract 10 units or less in the voting condition. 
We then use a linear probability model to estimate the effect of institution on proportion 
of cooperators. Both in the first generation (Table S2 col. 1) and over all generations 
(Table S2 col. 2), significantly more participants are cooperators in the voting condition 
than the unregulated treatment.  
 
To demonstrate that this finding is not an artefact of our binary classification of subjects 
as Cooperators or Non-cooperators, we also estimate the effect of institution on 
participants’ decision (extraction amount in unregulated, proposal amount in voting). 
Consistent with the binary analysis, participants’ decision extraction amounts are 
significantly lower under voting than when unregulated, both in the first generation 
(Table S2 col. 3) and over all generations (Table S2 col. 4). 
 
Table S2: Linear probability model estimating the effect of institution on likelihood of 
cooperation (col 1 and 2). Linear regression estimating the effect of institution on average 
decision (col 3 and 4). Standard errors clustered at the pool level. 
 
 Cooperator? Decision/Proposal 
 1st Generation All Generations 1st Generation All Generations 
1=Voting 0.220 0.201 -1.980 -2.290 
 (0.062)*** (0.050)*** (0.784)* (0.634)*** 
Constant 0.660 0.677 11.480 11.485 
 (0.054)*** (0.048)*** (0.677)*** (0.589)*** 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 
N       200       500        200        500 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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4.2 Effects of reducing δ and T 
Next we ask how reducing the discount factor δ and the extraction threshold T affects 
sustainability in the voting institution. To do so, we analyse all data from the five voting 
conditions (but not the ‘partial voting’ condition) jointly in a linear probability model, 
and estimate the probability of pools being sustained. 
 
Examining just the first generation (Table S3 col. 1), we see that neither δ (p = 0.223) nor 
T (p = 0.441) significantly affect sustainability, although both effects are trending in the 
positive direction (i.e. lower δ and lower T lead to less sustainability). Examining all 
generations (Table S3 col. 2), these effects accumulate, and we do observe significant 
decreases in sustainability when decreasing either δ (p = 0.037) or T (p < 0.001). 
However, the size of these effects is not so large quantitatively: decreasing δ by 0.1 
decreases the probability of a pool being sustained by 4.6%; and decreasing T by 10% 
decreases the probability of a pool being sustained by 14.6%.  
 
Table S3: Linear probability model estimating the effect of δ and T on pool sustainability 
under the voting institution. Standard errors clustered at pool level. 
 
 1st Generation All Generations 
δ 0.300 0.460 
 (0.245) (0.220)* 
T 0.002 0.015 
 (0.003) (0.002)*** 
Constant 0.660 -0.119 
 (0.254)* (0.235) 
R2 0.01 0.08 
N        100        418 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Most importantly, the probability of a pool being sustained under voting in any of these 
reduced δ or T cases is dramatically higher than when unregulated (Fraction of pools 
sustained: Unregulated, 6.3%; δ=0.7, 94%; δ=0.6, 89%, T=40, 81%; T=30, 71%; all 
differences from unregulated p < 0.001, see Table S4). Note that this is true even though 
the unregulated condition has the advantage of higher δ or T, depending on the voting 
condition.  
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Table S4: Linear probability model comparing pool sustainability in the unregulated 
condition (taken as the baseline) to the voting institutions with reduced δ or T. Standard 
errors clustered at pool level. 
 
 1st Generation All Generations 
   
1=Voting δ=0.7 0.750 0.881 
 (0.105)*** (0.037)*** 
1=Voting δ=0.6 0.750 0.823 
 (0.105)*** (0.048)*** 
1=Voting T=40% 0.750 0.644 
 (0.105)*** (0.054)*** 
1=Voting T=30% 0.800 0.746 
 (0.092)*** (0.044)*** 
Constant 0.200 0.062 
 (0.092)* (0.025)* 
R2 0.61 0.46 
N       100       440 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
4.3 Partial voting 
Finally, we examine the effect of a partial voting institution, under which only three of 
the five group members are bound by a vote. We use δ = 0.8 and T = 50%, and compare 
the fraction of pools sustained to all of our previous conditions. To do so, we use a linear 
probability model taking partial voting as the baseline, and estimate the proportion of 
pools sustained including dummies for each other condition. 
 
We see that both in the first generation (Table S5 col. 1) and over all generations (Table 
S5 col. 2), sustainability is dramatically lower in the partial voting condition than in any 
of the voting conditions, although partial voting does still lead to somewhat more 
sustainability than the unregulated case. 
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Table S5: Linear probability model comparing pool sustainability in the partial voting 
condition (taken as the baseline) to all other conditions. Standard errors clustered at pool 
level. 
 
 1st Generation All Generations 
1=Unregulated -0.500 -0.261 
 (0.140)*** (0.053)*** 
1=Voting baseline 0.300 0.677 
 (0.105)** (0.047)*** 
1=Voting δ=0.7 0.300 0.485 
 (0.105)** (0.060)*** 
1=Voting δ=0.6 0.250 0.383 
 (0.116)* (0.067)*** 
1=Voting T=40% 0.250 0.620 
 (0.116)* (0.055)*** 
1=Voting T=30% 0.250 0.562 
 (0.116)* (0.063)*** 
Constant 0.700 0.323 
 (0.105)*** (0.047)*** 
R2 0.50 0.47 
N       140       613 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
5. Simulated Sustainability Analysis 
 
Our analyses thus far have examined the actual outcomes that occurred in our 
experiment: the fraction of available pools that had been sustained in each generation, 
across the 20 pools initialized at the start of each condition. There are numerous sources 
of stochasticity that introduce noise into these comparisons. Due to the random 
continuation probability, some conditions lasted for more generations on average than 
others. The particular random matching of subjects into groups of five can affect the 
outcome: consider five subjects that cooperate and extract 10 units in the baseline, and 
five other subjects that defect and extract 20 units. A random matching that puts the five 
cooperators together and the five defectors together results in one sustained pool and one 
exhausted pool. But any other matching would result in two exhausted pools. Finally, a 
pool which is exhausted in an early generation which is then continued for many 
generations results in a very low sustainability score; whereas if the same pool had been 
continued for only one round, it would have had a high sustainability score. 
 
We address all of these sources of noise by conducting a set of computer simulations 
using the data generated by our participants. To do so, we take advantage of the fact that 
after the first generation, all subjects in a given condition received the same set of 
information, and therefore made decisions which are effectively interchangeable. Thus in 
each simulation run, we randomly sample (with replacement) a series of generations of 
Cooperating with the future – Supplementary Information  
 
 
Page S13 of S30 
participant decisions, and calculate the fraction of those generations in which the pool 
was refilled.  
 
Specifically, our procedure worked as follows, for each condition: 
1. For the first generation, randomly sample (with replacement) five participants 
from the first generation of the current experimental condition. 
2. Based on their decisions, and the rules of the experimental condition, determine 
whether the pool is sustained or exhausted. 
3. Determine if this game is continued for another generation by comparing a 
random number to δ. 
4. If so, randomly sample (with replacement) five participants from all generations 
of the current experimental condition except the first generation. 
5. If the pool has previously been exhausted, mark this generation as non-sustained. 
If the pool has not previously been exhausted, mark this generation as sustained, 
and determine (based on the sampled decisions and the rules of the experimental 
condition) whether the pool is sustained or exhausted for the next generation. 
6. Determine if this game is continued for another generation by comparing a 
random number to δ. If so, repeated steps 4 thru 6. 
 
Using this procedure, we first simulated 10,000 pools out to 15 generations for the 
Unregulated, Voting and Partial Voting conditions. As can be seen in Extended Data 
Figure 1a, the results are striking: the Voting institution is dramatically more successful 
at sustaining the pool than either the Partial Voting or the Unregulated conditions.  
 
We also used this procedure to examine the consequences of changing δ and T under the 
Voting institution. To do so, we simulated 10,000 games out to 15 generations for the T = 
40% and T = 30% conditions, and 1,000,000 games out to 15 generations for the δ = 0.7 
and δ = 0.6 conditions, and compared the results to the Voting condition simulations 
above. We simulated a larger number of replicates for the lower δ conditions because the 
games in those conditions were dramatically shorter on average, and so many more 
replicated were required to get a reasonable amount of data out to 15 generations. As can 
be seen in Extended Data Figure 1b, reducing δ has only a small effect, and although 
reducing T does undermine sustainability, the effect is much less dramatic than that of 
Unregulated or Partial Voting despite the higher value of T in these less-regulated 
conditions.  
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6. Positive association between democracy and sustainability 
 
Our experiments suggest that a democratic institution can help a majority of prosocial 
individuals override a purely selfish minority, leading to costly group-level cooperation 
with future generations. Real-world data are consistent with this suggestion from our 
experiments: across 128 countries, more democratic institutions are associated with 
greater efforts to act sustainably and mitigate environmental impact. 
 
To provide this evidence, we combine data from two independent sources: The 2012 
Democracy Index25 created by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, part of the 
Economist magazine family of businesses) and the 2013 Sustainability Index created by 
the organization World Energy26. Both data files are publicly accessible on the respective 
websites. We examine the 128 countries included in both datasets. 
 
The Democracy Index (DI) is calculated using a weighted average of a 60-item measure 
with items distributed over five categories: electoral process, civil liberties, government, 
political participation, and political culture. In addition to assigning a numeric DI to each 
of 167 countries, the EIU also classifies each country into one of our regime types by its 
index. The four regime types are (DI ranges in parentheses): Full Democracies (DI ≥ 8), 
Flawed Democracies (6 ≤ DI < 8), Hybrid Regimes (4 ≤ DI < 6), and Authoritarian 
Regimes (DI < 4). 
 
The Energy Sustainability Index is a composite of three subscales:  
• Energy security - the effective management of primary energy supply from 
domestic and external sources, the reliability of energy infrastructure, and the 
ability of participating energy companies to meet current and future demand. 
• Energy equity - the accessibility and affordability of energy supply across the 
population. 
• Environmental sustainability - the achievement of supply and demand-side energy 
efficiencies and the development of energy supply from renewable and other low-
carbon sources. 
We analyse both the overall sustainability index as well as the environmental impact 
mitigation subscale since it is the most directly relevant to our question of interest. 
 
Consistent with our experimental results, we find that there is a significant positive 
correlation between democratic institutions and sustainability (Extended Data Figure 2): 
countries with higher democracy scores also score higher in their efforts to act 
sustainably (Table S6 Col 1; p < 0.001) and specifically to mitigate environmental 
impact (Table S7 Col 1; p < 0.001).  
 
As a first step towards testing the robustness of this relationship, we examine the effect of 
including controls for the 2014 gross domestic product27 (GDP, in US$, compiled by the 
World Bank), Gini index28 (a measure of wealth inequality, using the most recent year 
available for each country on quandl.com), literacy rates29 (using the most recent year 
available for each country, complied by the Central Intelligence Agency), average life 
expectancy30 in each country in 2013 (complied by the World Health Organization), the 
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level of corruption31 in each country (compiled in 2004 by the World Bank), each 
country’s population size28 and the rate of unemployment28 (both using the most recent 
year available for each country on quandl.com). Missing values for controls are 
interpolated, using the mean of all non-missing values. As shown in Tables S6 Col 2 and 
S7 Col 2, we continue to find a significant positive relationship between democracy 
scores and both the overall sustainability index (p = 0.001) and the environmental impact 
mitigation score (p < 0.001). Finally, we also consider the effects of the logarithmic 
transformations of GDP and population size of each country, as these variables are 
heavily right-skewed. We find that our results remain unchanged (Col 3 in Tables S6 and 
S7): more democratic institutions have more sustainable energy policies (p < 0.001) and 
engage in greater efforts to mitigate environmental impact (p < 0.001). 
 
Thus we provide preliminary evidence that democracy may indeed lead to better 
environmental practices. Obviously this analysis does not control many additional 
potential confounding factors, and is correlational, not causal. We hope that these 
preliminary results will inspire empirical scholars to investigate this issue further in 
future work. 
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Table S6. Linear regression predicting the overall sustainability index with democracy 
score.  
 
 Sustainability 
Index 
Sustainability 
Index 
Sustainability 
Index 
Democracy index 0.585 0.211 0.227 
 (0.073)*** (0.062)*** (0.054)*** 
GDP (in US$)  1.710e-07  
  (7.143e-08)*  
Gini index  -0.008 -0.004 
  (0.013) (0.012) 
Population size  -1.376e-06  
  (4.761e-07)** 
Literacy rate  2.753 1.003 
  (1.096)* (0.963) 
Unemployment rate  -2.651 -1.298 
  (1.982) (1.703) 
Life expectancy (years)  0.060 0.006 
  (0.028)* (0.022) 
Level of corruption  0.022 0.011 
  (0.006)*** (0.006) 
log(GDP)   0.782 
   (0.170)*** 
log(Population)   -0.591 
   (0.181)** 
Constant 1.454 -3.703 -1.424 
 (0.474)** (1.807)* (1.763) 
R2 0.36 0.63 0.72 
N 128 128 128 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table S7. Linear regression predicting the environmental impact mitigation score with 
democracy score.  
 
 Environmental 
Impact Mitigation 
Score 
Environmental 
Impact Mitigation 
Score 
Environmental 
Impact Mitigation 
Score 
Democracy index 0.652 0.662 0.668 
 (0.107)*** (0.130)*** (0.130)*** 
GDP (in US$)  1.274e-08  
  (1.373e-07)  
Gini index  0.040 0.039 
  (0.031) (0.031) 
Population size  -3.523e-06  
   (1.128e-06)** 
Literacy rate  -2.089 -2.022 
  (2.077) (2.295) 
Unemployment rate  -1.598 -1.524 
  (4.408) (4.667) 
Life expectancy 
(years) 
 0.030 0.038 
  (0.049) (0.056) 
Level of corruption  0.002 0.005 
  (0.013) (0.015) 
log(GDP)   -0.118 
   (0.332) 
log(Population)   -0.088 
   (0.351) 
Constant 1.029 -0.796 0.443 
 (0.676) (3.026) (4.371) 
R2 0.21 0.26 0.24 
N 128 128 128 
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7. Instructions 
 
Sample Instructions for Main Conditions 
 
Unregulated treatment (all instructions and comprehension questions on the same page): 
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Correct answers: 1) No (because 8+9+10+12+17 units > 50), 2) 80%, 3) No. 
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For those subjects who pass the quiz, the next page is always the decision-making screen. 
Within a treatment, this screen is identical for every generation except for the first 
generation. Between treatments, the only change is the treatment-specific wording (e.g., 
in Unregulated, “How many units do you want to extract from the common pool?” is 
replaced by “How many units do you propose should be extracted by each player?” in 
the Voting treatment). 
 
Here is the decision-making screen for the first generation in Unregulated: 
 
 
 
 
For every generation afterwards, the screen looks as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Those (in later generations) that received an empty pool saw the following message: 
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Instructions in the Voting treatment: 
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Correct answers: 1) No (because 5*12 units > 50), 2) 80%, 3) No. 
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Sample Instructions for Voting with Varied Parameters 
 
Threshold variation (T=40% is pictured here, T=30% looks equivalent with adjusted 
values): 
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Correct answers: 1) No (because 5*10 units > 40), 2) 80%, 3) No. 
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Discount rate variation (δ=0.7 is pictured here, δ=0.6 looks equivalent with adjusted 
values): 
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Correct answers: 1) No (because 12*5 units > 50), 2) 70%, 3) No. 
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Sample Instructions for Partial Voting 
 
Partial treatment (these also act as the “counter-balanced” second set of instructions that 
are presented after making a decision to all subjects in other conditions, see Section 2.2 
for details): 
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Correct answers: 1) 10, 2) No (because 53 units > 50), 3) 80%, 4) No. 
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